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Public policy systems often betray signs of capacity stress. Supply factors seem to 
lag behind demand, and as a result these systems sustain what appears to be 
chronically sub-optimal performance neither completely excelling nor completely 
failing in what they do. How should we interpret these syndromes? Although 
competing theoretical explanations can shed partial light, potential ‘blind spots’ 
between them mean that they are not able to capture capacity stress in its entirety. In 
this paper I introduce the concept of ‘chronic capacity stress’ (CCS) as a holistic 
governance-style approach. I show how capacity stress is closely associated with 
four interrelated factors: 1) misalignment between policy goals and the external 
environment; 2) cultures of coping and adaptation; 3) direct and benign resistance to 
change; and 4) sustained obsolescence and inefficiency. The CCS heuristic provides 
a useful way of understanding dialectical dynamics of stress and equilibrium in UK 
policy systems.   
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Frequently the disruption of a political system is not that complete; the 
stress is present even though the system continues to persist in some 
form.  
            David Easton 
i
 
 
For many good reasons political scientists have devoted attention in recent decades 
to understanding the extremes of public sector performance. At the crisis end of the 
spectrum, concepts such as ‘policy disasters’ (Gray & T’hart, 1998), ‘policy fiascos’ 
(Bovens & T’hart, 2005), ‘service delivery disasters’ (Dunleavy et al., 2010), or 
‘government blunders’ (King & Crewe, 2013) have offered useful insights into why 
things have a tendency to go badly wrong. At the success end, there has been less 
systematic analysis (McConnell, 2010), but interest none the less in the application 
of aspirational management concepts to the public sector (Osbourne and Gaebler, 
1992; Talbot, 2010). Although focusing on these extremes can be helpful in 
understanding how policy systems work (or do not), it should not distract from the 
fact that many show signs of operating in a qualitatively complex middle ground 
between the two extremes of complete success and abject failure.  
 If we look carefully and long enough at large policy systems, particularly 
those that fulfil core functions of state, they often betray signs of continual capacity 
stress. The perception is that the demands and expectations that are put on these 
systems by governments and society are greater than their capacity to respond. 
Supply of outputs (and outcomes) appear to lag persistently behind perceived 
demands whatever they may be. Symptoms include continual backlogs, insufficient 
staffing and resourcing, crowding and congestion, or not having the right equipment 
in the right place at the right time. Stress may be insufficient to bring about acute 
collapse of the system (although from time to time acute problems may flare up). But 
it is significant enough to stop the system from performing to its optimal potential. In 
short, these systems find ways of absorbing stress, adapting or coping with it, and 
often normalizing it so that, as the quote above suggests, they persist in some form or 
other.  
 Competing theories of social behaviour however take us only so far in 
understanding this qualitatively complex middle ground. Reliance on particular 
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theories shed some light, but also perpetuate ‘blind spots’ in our overall 
understanding of how and why policy systems sustain capacity stress. Indeed, critics 
have expressed a need for more integrative and ‘negotiated’ theoretical approaches to 
understanding governance problems (Peters, 2010; Cairney, 2013a). The aim of this 
paper is to make a contribution along these lines by introducing the concept of 
‘chronic capacity stress’ (CCS) that can help us to bring these potential blind spots 
into more direct focus. I define CCS as follows: 
- A significant stress on the capacity of a policy system to respond to 
expectations and demands made on it; 
- one that is sustainable over time (often long periods), and can be managed 
as such, and therefore becomes chronic; 
- one that is a function of the way in which the system itself is governed 
and operates; and 
- one that is simultaneously both cause and symptom of dysfunction in the 
system. 
The concept itself has grown out of my research on overcrowding in the England and 
Wales prison system (Bastow, 2013a). This has been an archetypal problem of 
capacity stress for many decades, and it provided the detailed empirical basis from 
which I have developed the outlines of CCS (Bastow, 2012b). As I show here, this 
concept has more general applicability across different policy systems. 
 The paper is in three parts. First, I discuss three potential ‘blind spots’ that are 
sustained by axiomatic theoretical approaches. I explain how the problem of capacity 
stress draws attention to these blind spots, and why we need something like the CCS 
heuristic to neutralize their effects and to formulate tools for diagnosing stress-
related syndromes in large policy systems. In the second part I discuss the four 
aspects of CCS and inherently compensating and countervailing relationships 
between them. These four component parts are as follows, 1) misalignment between 
goals of the system and external environment; 2) cultures of coping and adaptation; 
3) benign resistance to change; and 4) sustained obsolescence and inefficiency. I 
draw on examples from the UK public sector, including immigration and border 
control, welfare administration, defence, and prisons. Finally, I illustrate how these 
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four aspects interact in compensating and dialectical ways, and the implications for 
these theoretical blind spots.  
 
Three potential blind spots  
 
Just as the brain renders invisible the physiological blind spot 
and gives the illusion that the visual field is continuous and 
complete, so the mythology of science has the function of hiding 
from view the holes in the fields of consciousness and 
rationality. 
       William Byers 
ii
 
 
In social science, dichotomies can often help researchers define the realm of all 
potential observable outcomes. Dichotomous pairs mark out this realm and, as the 
quotes suggests, give substance to the ‘illusion’ that the visual field (i.e. all 
observable outcomes) is ‘continuous and complete’. But they can also perpetuate 
blind spots. We may assume that pairs exist at either end of linear or continuous 
spectrums, on which it is possible to identify ‘blended’ points between both. The 
problem here is that complex realities often involve distinct qualitative 
characteristics of both at the same time, and not just a single average point between 
the two. It is necessary to make room for the fact that policy systems can display 
aspects of success and failure simultaneously, thus casting doubt over the assumption 
that it is continuous blended terrain from one extreme to the other. In this section, I 
discuss three potential blind spots.  
The first blind spot lies in the relationship between economistic explanations 
of chronic stress through over-supply and under-supply of outputs. From the 1970s 
onwards, many critics diagnosed the syndrome of the UK state as one of chronic 
over-supply. This reflected a perception of largely unchecked and excessive growth 
in the size of the state, and a sense that it had become unmanageably large, top-
heavy, and in need of radical downsizing (King, 1975; Rose, 1979). Public choice 
theorists of the era, notably William Niskanen (1971), provided theoretical 
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explanation for this perceived top-heaviness through the self-interested 'budget-
maximizing' behaviour of bureaucrats (and, we assume, politicians). Such behaviour 
was key to understanding chronic over-supply of outputs by the state and public 
sector. Reining in the ‘maximizing’ behaviour of the state and its constituent actors 
was seen as constituent of a more sustainable balance.  
 As ‘new right’ ideologies took hold in the UK throughout the 1980s and 
beyond, waves of managerialist and market reforms swept through the state, largely 
in response to these perceptions of overweight regimes. Whereas critical focus had 
previously been on the tendency for self-interested elites to sustain over-supply, 
political scientists began to see the problem implicitly as one of chronic under-
supply. Here these (same) bureaucrats could find ways of successfully extracting rent 
or ‘shaping’ their budgets so as to extract value from the system for their own 
benefits, and subsequently pass the costs of this extraction down to actors below 
them in the system (Tullock,1967; Dunleavy, 1991). Elites had incentive to shape 
their own jurisdictions and budgets, extract value, and consequently squeeze the 
system below them in order to compensate for their own value-extracting activity. 
The analogy here is one of chronic tightening, increasingly forcing actors below to 
run at ever more ‘close-to-tolerance’ levels. This cumulative squeezing through the 
system sustained capacity stress through chronic under-supply. 
 This dichotomy, grossly simplified though it is here, raises questions for how 
we understand capacity stress. In economistic terms, we can envisage both concepts 
as lying on a continuum around a point at which supply and demand curves are in 
some kind of equilibrium. Either we are over-resourcing a prison system and need to 
find ways of trimming excess fat; or we are under-resourcing it and need to find new 
money and capacity. Logically there is one point somewhere in the middle at which 
the two intersect. The potential problem with this however is that such linear 
understanding distracts from the fact that it may be possible for policy systems to 
sustain qualitatively distinct elements of over-supply and under-supply at the same 
time. In systems under stress, we find signs of apparent under-supply as they are 
squeezed (particularly in an austerity era as resources are cut). Yet, paradoxically, the 
very fact that these systems are under stress means that they sustain inefficiency, 
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obsolescence, and redundancy, by being unable to innovate effectively or introduce 
long-term modernization. In short, they can sustain relative over-supply as well.  
The second blind spot relates to a well-established axiomatic distinction 
between what Mary Douglas (1986) has called the ‘double-stranded view of social 
behaviour’ (p18) - transactional and cognitive explanations. The transactional strand 
relates to ‘individual utility-maximizing activity described in a cost-benefit calculus’, 
while cognitive strand relates to ‘the individual demand for order and coherence and 
control of uncertainty’ (p18), largely through development of institutions and 
constituent cultures. Although significant contributions have been made over the 
years to reconcile these strands (not least Scharpf (1997) from the cognitive camp or 
Besley (2006) from the economistic transactional camp), critics still point to the 
inherent difficulties of reconciling both extremes in ways that help to understand 
governance of complex policy systems. Peters (2010), for example, reflects that 
‘governance approaches do not have any explicit mechanisms of integrating 
individuals and structures’ (p17) and suggests that ‘many approaches to social theory 
tend to focus on a single explanation or actor, rather than on how the possible 
explanations can be brought together in a more comprehensive explanation’ (p8).  
 Concepts over the years have helped to bridge this gap and explain how 
failure can become chronic in organizations. Meyer and Zucker’s (1989) 
‘permanently failing organizations’ has much to offer in this sense, grounding its 
explanation of ‘failing’ in the strategic self-interest of influential ‘dependent’ actors, 
perhaps strong unions or professional groups, to perpetuate sub-optimal status-quo 
situations. The appeal of this concept is that it provides a specific mechanism 
through which organizations chronically under-perform. At the same time, the very 
concept of ‘permanent failure’ implies strongly fatalistic institutional culture (Hood, 
1998), and this can have an important feedback effect on the way in which actors in 
the system view their predicaments and possibilities. If a system is labelled as 
‘failing’, this must to some extent shape the content and limitations of strategic self-
interest. There may be little point, for example, in senior ministers setting out to 
‘reform the un-reformable’ when they can opt to ‘play a straight bat’ until they move 
up to another portfolio. Equally, there may be strong incentives for coping managers 
or staff to portray their bit of the system as being on the brink of collapse or crisis, 
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with a view to securing extra attention or resources. Hargrove and Glidewell’s 
(1990) ‘impossible jobs’ also depicts similarly deep-seated interaction between 
transactional and cognitive dynamics. In characterising the challenge for the top 
officials or commissioners in those systems, they suggest that ‘commissioners cope 
with an impossible job; they never master it or control it’ (p45). When a system is 
out of touch with exogenous pressures from its wider environment, a dominant 
response for actors responsible is to find ways of adapting and making things work.  
 The third potential blind spot relates to the dichotomy between deterministic 
and holistic explanations (i.e. parts versus whole). Political scientists seek to 
formulate specific and ‘testable’ hypotheses about causal factors behind capacity 
stress, and aspire to what King et al. (1994) describe as ‘parsimony’ of explanation. 
Yet, capacity stress, indeed any kind of stress, is often the outcome of compensating 
and dialectical dynamics. In order to see these dynamics working it seems reasonable 
that we should set our lens wide enough to see the whole system working (not just 
bits of it), and the more we venture towards holistic appreciation of the problem, the 
more we inevitably sacrifice parsimony for a ‘more general notion of maximizing 
leverage’ (King et al., 1994, p104).iii The dichotomy between determinism and 
holism therefore requires that we have flexibility in the focal length of our 
evaluation, as well as specificity about the parameters of the system and actors that 
we are including in the frame.  
 Holistic approaches to understanding the characteristics of policy systems 
have not been lost on political scientists over the decades. Throughout the 1960s, 
systems-style explanations of political and social phenomena developed prominence 
in in Europe and in the US.  Crozier (1964), for example, identifies specific 
mechanisms inherent in bureaucracies that perpetuate inward-looking cultures, and 
lags in taking up what we acknowledge as standard modern practices in society. 
Crises, for Crozier, play a vital function in forcing these inward-looking systems to 
adapt. David Easton’s (1967) work on political systems examined how and why 
political systems are able to sustain and adapt to stress, both internally generated 
within the system and externally from its environment. As he put it:    
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Political systems accumulate large repertoires of mechanisms through which 
they may seek to cope with their environments. Through these they may 
regulate their own behaviour, transform their internal structure, and even go so 
far as to remodel their fundamental goals. Few systems, other than social 
systems, have this potentiality’ (p18) 
 
Holistic approaches to public problems have come back into fashion in recent 
decades. Cybernetics (Dunsire, 1990), complexity theory (Teisman & Klijn, 2008; 
Teisman et al., 2009), and evolutionary theory (Cairney, 2013b) have all been 
applied in explorative ways to public policy and governance.
iv
 In different ways, 
these have drawn on a three-way relationship that is central to the holistic viewpoint: 
A. prevailing values and goals of the system; 
B. the way in which the system is set up to deliver on these 
objectives; and 
C. the way in these two factors are aligned with the system’s external 
environment.  
Adapted in a strategic management context, Roberts (2004) explains the generic 
holistic challenge as ‘one of selecting the (long run) value-maximizing strategy for 
the particular environment and then creating the organization that will best realise it’ 
(p22). The central point for Roberts here is the quality of the dynamic equilibrium 
and complementarity between these three concepts. He argues that it is impossible 
for the system to maintain continually optimal alignment. The system as a whole will 
inevitably incorporate certain aggravating misalignments with its environment that 
put pressure or stress on its ability to perform. For him, and other management 
scientists, the best that can be hoped for is a kind of acceptably sub-optimal level of 
alignment over time.
v
  
 It is therefore important to keep the analytical lens as wide as possible. After 
all, understanding how systems sustain stress requires that we are able to 
conceptualise the system itself and how it interacts with its environment. Stress is an 
artefact of the system as a whole, not simply bits of it. Sceptics may immediately 
criticize the ‘everything-and-nothing’ nature of this term (Phillips, 1976; Rosenberg, 
1995), and question legitimately how we know which ‘bits’ to include and which not 
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to include. It is all the more important to be cautious in defining the parameters of the 
system, and to look for specific (and even testable) concepts or variables that explain 
how and why systems sustain capacity stress. In this sense, we are looking to be as 
deterministic as we possibly can be, while maintaining sufficient looseness in the 
overall approach that we are to feed actual empirical observation into the 
development of the overall model. To the development of the CCS model is where I 
turn in the next section.  
 
Four inter-related aspects of CCS 
In setting out these potential blind spots, it is not a case of accepting or rejecting 
these constituent theories. The dichotomies help us to envisage the parameters of the 
theoretical universe out there, and they must in this sense form the component parts 
for any theoretical understanding. But it is likely also that they only provide strands 
of insight into how the actual universe functions in reality. By introducing the 
concept of CCS, the aim is to push forward our understanding of how many large 
and complex policy systems ‘actually operate’, as Amann (2013) puts it,vi and 
provide a schema or heuristic for straightening out the distracting or distorting effects 
of these blind spots.   
 The development of the CCS heuristic is methodologically deductive and 
inductive. Indeed, this is a further blind-spot-inducing dichotomy that I have not yet 
mentioned, but it shows exactly how the constructed norms of methodological theory 
can often bear little or no resemblance to the way in which theoretical and empirical 
knowledge interact in real-life research projects. The theory discussed in the previous 
section provides the foundation for the CCS concept. In this sense, it builds on 
nothing else but existing theoretical knowledge. At the same time, however, its 
development is absolutely contingent upon in-depth empirical research into whole 
policy systems, and the aggravating and compensating dynamics that sustain 
‘optimal sub-optimal’ equilibriums in them. We can only learn about this however by 
talking to actors in the system, understanding their predicaments, the extent of their 
constrained autonomy, and the overall outcomes that cumulatively emerge.  
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 The root foundations for CCS are none the less deductive. In a sense, the 
order in which the three blind spots were discussed in the previous section depicted a 
‘layering-up’ of theoretical explanations from individualistic to whole-system 
approaches. In developing the CCS schema, we can work deductively in reverse, 
setting out the holistic picture and digging down into the transactional and cognitive 
dynamics within. We pick up therefore where we left off with the three holistic 
aspects – goals, organization, and environment. I generate four relationships between 
them that together form the basis of a holistic appreciation of how a policy system 
operates dynamically in its environment. The schema is set out below in Figure 1, 
and includes these four alignments (or potential misalignments) that could 
conceivably aggravate stress in a policy system. These are indicated by the arrows 
and labels (a) to (d). I work through each of these four potential misalignments 
drawing on some brief illustrations from a range of UK policy sectors.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
a) Value-based goals are misaligned with changes in the external environment 
When societies change, or at least the problems they present, we may expect the 
values and goals of policy systems to change with them. But this is not necessarily 
the case. Societal change, although it may evolve gradually over time, can often take 
policy makers and governments by surprise. It can happen imperceptibly and may 
only be brought to awareness of policy makers through periods of punctuated 
equilibrium, perhaps as ‘policy streams’ converge (Kingdon, 2003) or as external 
shocks trigger ex-post policy responses (Depoorter, 2006). At key junctures, 
governments and policy makers make sweeping changes to redress misalignment that 
has been allowed to build up. Alternatively, actors may be well aware of gradual 
change, but these may present long-term collective action problems and policy 
makers are able continually to avoid the issue and leave it for their successors to 
negotiate.  
 Value-based goals may also be too ambiguous or not robust enough to 
maintain sufficient clarity about what policies seek to achieve. Rainey and Chun 
(2005), for example, see ‘goal ambiguity’ as having a marginal undermining effect 
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on performance in large public sector organizations. But as Roberts and colleagues 
suggest, firms can often be high-performing simply by maintaining ‘optimal sub-
optimality’ across competing goals, and the same presumably applies to public sector 
systems. The prison system, for example, has for many decades sought to find ways 
of reconciling self-stated goals around deterrence and reform (McConville, 1995a, 
1995b). Similarly, the armed forces procurement logistics continually have to 
reconcile the need to have modern and functioning equipment ready on time for 
armed forces to deploy, while keeping procurement and inventory costs as low as 
possible.  
 Stress is aggravated if sudden changes in the external environment conflict 
with prevailing goals. For example, the unprecedented increase in the size of the 
short-sentence prison population in England and Wales prisons from 1993 onwards 
can be traced to more punitive sentencing by the courts (Hough et al., 2003). In 1993, 
the average number of prisoners sentenced to less than six months custody entering 
the prison system was around 22,000, yet by the start of the 2000s, this number had 
more than doubled to over 50,000. While the prison system was filling with 
relatively low-risk short-term offenders in need of targeted rehabilitative 
interventions, the political priorities of the system were focused on how to maintain 
security and ensure zero escapes (Cavadino and Dignan, 2003 and 2006). It was not 
until the mid-2000s that the policy elites in the prison system began to shape policy 
goals more explicitly towards this increasing short-sentence section of the prison 
population.  
We see a similar lag in ability of governments and UK armed forces to move 
away from Cold War paradigms of conflict and procurement towards new forms of 
strategic engagement associated with a post 9-11 terrorist and 'rogue state' era. The 
following text is taken from the 2010 Strategic Defence Review: 
 
Our Armed Forces – admired across the world – have been overstretched, 
deployed too often without appropriate planning, with the wrong equipment, in 
the wrong numbers and without a clear strategy. In the past, unfunded spending 
pledges created a fundamental mismatch between aspiration and resources. 
And there was a failure to face up to the new security realities of the post-Cold 
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War world. The Royal Navy was locked into a cycle of ever smaller numbers 
of ever more expensive ships. We have an Army with scores of tanks in 
Germany but forced to face the deadly threat of improvised explosive devices 
in Iraq and Afghanistan in Land Rovers designed for Northern Ireland. And the 
Royal Air Force has been hampered in its efforts to support our forces overseas 
because of an ageing and unreliable strategic airlift fleet. This is the result of 
the failure to take the bold decisions needed to adjust our defence plans to face 
the realities of our ever-changing world. (MOD, 2010, p4) 
 
b) Organisational design of the system is not set up to deliver value-based goals 
Whatever the goals of a policy system, there is pressure on the actors at all levels to 
deliver against those expectations. When the system is not sufficiently set up to meet 
those goals (either in perception or in actuality), then it is likely, as Hargrove and 
Glidewell remind us, that cultures of coping will persist. There is potentially 
complex interplay between strategic self-interest and cognitive cultural implications 
of coping. Actors in the system may see their own predicament as one of having to 
cope with the pressures imposed from above or externally, and there is often a 
permanent sense of fatalism that pervades the organization. Particularly in the types 
of agencies more commonly associated with ‘impossible jobs’, staff see their levels 
of professional autonomy as more constrained (CSPS, 2013). Yet officials are also 
keenly aware of the strategic benefits of perpetuating a perception that the system is 
(just about) coping on the brink of acute crisis. Actors may cope, but may also use 
coping to their strategic advantage. 
 Coping may be a straightforward consequence of a sudden increase in the 
demand for services. In welfare administration since 2008, officials have had to 
contend with a near-doubling in the number of claimants of Jobseekers Allowance 
(JSA) in the period of one year.
vii
 The UK National Audit Office reported that 
officials had to radically reduce the average time spent with new claimants in order 
to cope with the increase, dropping way below the statutory requirement of two 
hours per claimant (NAO, 2013b, p14). Coping mechanisms may also become 
normalized in the standard practices of policy systems. In his report on UK border 
control, John Vine (2012, p14) found that suspensions of security checks on 
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passengers entering the UK had become a broadly accepted part of standard 
operating procedure for officials coping with sudden build-ups of queues at major 
UK ports.
viii
 Senior officials interviewed in the border system pointed out that these 
checks had become legitimated as part of a culture of ‘making the system work’, 
often on grounds of health and safety, or in the case of French ports, responding to 
requests from the French authorities to deal with excessive build-up of traffic leading 
up to the ports.  
A strong factor during the last three decades in allowing systems to 
rationalize and cope with demand-side pressures has been the impact of 
managerialism (Bastow, 2012b and 2013). The emergence of performance 
management and target cultures has helped policy systems to construct ‘acceptable’ 
levels of performance, and demonstrate success or failure against these thresholds. 
The dynamics here however seem dialectical. On the one hand, performance-based 
management has provided a sense of legitimacy that services are meeting targets in 
acceptable ways. For example, throughout the late 1990s and 2000s, the prison 
system grew a considerable number of performance targets for a wide range of its 
activities, including reduction of escapes, control of crowding, and provision of 
prisoner education and treatment programmes. On the basis of many of these targets, 
it is possible to argue that the system has improved its performance markedly over 
the last twenty years in some important aspects. Performance management has also 
contributed in part to helping the system to cope with the increase in prisoner 
numbers, and provided a basis to introduce ‘compensating’ reductions in service 
quality such as redefining crowding limits, cutting back on time out of cell for 
prisoners, and ‘disinvesting’ across the systemix (Bastow, 2013). However, 
constructed target regimes have provided a basis for distracting attention away from 
other policy goals. While it has provided a particular type of basis for legitimacy, it 
has also deprioritised focus on rehabilitative goals of prison, its formal measurement 
and evaluation. Up until 2010, throughout twenty years of NPM target cultures, the 
prison system had never had a specific target for reducing reoffending of those in its 
custody. 
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c) Difficulties of implementing value-based goals due to resistance from within the 
system 
Very few, if any, organizations or systems can be seen as ‘pure’ coping archetypes. 
Many policy systems show clear signs of coping characteristics, but these are often 
countered by bouts of proactive reform. In many UK policy systems, we can identify 
varying degrees of improvement in performance over the decades, largely the result 
of actors at all levels of the system from high politics down to ‘street-level’ staff 
running these systems in more cost-effective and professional ways. We cannot 
discount here the improving effects, controversial though this will sound, of 
managerialism, technology modernization, outsourcing, and professionalization. 
Nevertheless, attempts at reform must often contend with direct or benign forms of 
resistance from other actors in the system. Meyer and Zucker (1989) make this very 
observation. ‘As power accrues to dependent actors’ they argue, ‘performance 
deteriorates while persistence is enhanced. Less precisely but more poignantly, 
politics degrades performance but enhances persistence in these organizations’ 
(p153).  
 In prisons, dependent actors such as unions have been able to wield 
considerable political power. Over the decades, the Prison Officers Association 
(POA) have influenced (indeed often held to ransom) the decisions of ministers and 
senior officials, particularly in constraining growth of markets for privately-managed 
prisons and negotiating comparatively strong pay and conditions packages. In border 
control, there are also signs of strongly embedded operational cultures and 
professional groups of frontline staff, but there is perhaps less sign of the explicitly 
resistant union culture that has been found in the prison system over the years. In 
defence procurement too, ‘top brass’ in armed forces here also play a strong part in 
constraining the ability of the ministers and officials to shape the overall capability to 
more directly suit the changing face of military challenges in a post-Cold War 
environment.  
Resistance may also come from above in the form of veto to certain types of 
change that threaten to upset politically manageable equilibrium. Ministers, for 
example, may veto what might seem quite sensible managerial modernization. This 
cuts to the heart of well-established debates and questions around the relationship 
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between ministers and their senior operational officials, and the extent to which these 
officials should or can have autonomy to manage their organizations free from 
excessive political influence (Page, 1992; Horn, 1995). There is a fine balance here 
between keeping ministers happy, and introducing managerial changes to improve 
value for money.
x
 This is illustrated by the controversies around suspensions of 
biometric checks in the border system (Bastow, 2012a). At the operational level, 
managers had retained the discretion to suspend biometric fingerprint checks on 
incoming passengers during times of heightened queue pressure at major UK 
airports. In April 2011 however, the Home Secretary banned the suspension of these 
biometric fingerprint checks on the grounds that they were undermining border 
security, and on finding out that they had continued between May and November 
2011 (albeit at a reduced rate), she forced the resignation of senior border staff and 
brought the control of the border force back into the fold of the Home Office. Prior to 
political intervention, border force managers had been running entirely sensible risk-
based pilots to introduce discretionary suspensions of checking for certain low-risk 
groups of passengers. The result of this controversy was that all risk-based measures 
were cancelled, and border officials were required to reinstate 100 per cent checks on 
all incoming passengers.  
A more benign but equally important type of resistance is a basic function of a 
coping system working continually at its limits – or at least perceiving itself to do so. 
In coping organizations the perception is that the system is running at the peak of its 
capacity, regardless of whether it is or not, and hence those working inside will tend 
to be benignly resistant simply due to their constrained ability to take on new 
initiatives for change or reform. They are not resistant out of self-interest per se, but 
rather because the constraints of the system allows little else. The prison system, for 
example, has had to find practical ways of coping with a sharp rise in the number of 
short-sentence prisoners, and has done so by continually running its estate at levels 
of capacity close to 100 per cent. In doing so, it has had to constantly move the short-
sentence prison population around the estate to smooth demand and fill spare 
capacity in order to receive new intakes. This is a complex logistical operation that 
has been run centrally since the mid-1990s, and has been essential ‘life support’ for 
coping with a crowded prison estate. The fact that these short-sentence prisoners 
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have to be moved around constantly in this way however perpetuates an idea that 
there is a limit to what extent the system can do anything with them in terms of 
reducing likelihood of reoffending. Actors in the system are able to recognize this as 
a constraint on their ability to achieve more ambitious rehabilitative goals, but it is a 
practical reality of the system that its stability relies on this constant disruptive 
movement.   
 
d) Organisational design of the system lags behind changes in the external 
environment 
The fourth aspect of the CCS schema is an important one. As discussed above, the 
concept of stress in modern policy systems suggests a problem of chronic under-
supply. The question that is raised here is how capacity stress can be purely a 
problem of under-supply when we see many striking examples of these systems 
incorporating sustained obsolescence and inefficiency in the way they operate. There 
is a paradox here, in that actors in these systems may complain about continual 
financial and supply-side pressures, but they also appear to be working in systems 
that incorporate often striking levels of obsolescent technology, archaic standards, 
relative over-supply of staff, latent capacity in the way current resources are 
deployed, maintenance of archaic information systems, and general inefficiency in 
the way operations are put together.  
In systems that incorporate resistance and coping characteristics, we should 
expect to see some degree of obsolescence and inefficiency creeping in. In the 
employment benefits system, for example, the ‘legacy’ effects of having to manage 
archaic information systems have greatly increased the costs of modernization, and 
hence the administration of employment benefits has remained in a perpetual state of 
only partly-functioning transition to a digital-era system (Dunleavy and Carrera, 
2013). These legacy systems are however ‘business-critical’ in that they play a vital 
part in the on-going administration of benefits, and hence become sustained as an 
increasingly archaic part of the day-to-day operations. The syndrome here is that 
managerialist reforms may continually shape and squeeze cost efficiencies out of the 
system, but in doing so, they also entrench obsolescent ways of working, so that 
organizations exhibit a continual Crozerian tendency to stay significantly behind the 
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curve of wider society practices and technologies. Again, staff can recognize the 
eccentricities or inadequacies of these systems, but also make the point that they are 
critical to the day-to-day business of the organization. The paradox is that they are 
the symptoms of coping, yet are also critical to the coping process. 
 Similar obsolescence is conspicuously visible in the prison system (Bastow, 
2013). For example, up until 2010, the main prisoner database system had been an 
ageing DOS system, resembling something from the mid-1980s rather than what we 
might expect from a modern logistic operation in the late 2000s. Prior to 2010 
therefore, managers and staff were not able to get real-time information about which 
prisoners were in which prisons at any one time. Whereas most large logistics 
companies and hotel chains by the late 2000s were running their operations using 
sophisticated software programs and tracking devices, NOMS officials were still 
operating their logistical movement of prisoners around the estate with telephones, 
paper and pencil. Of course, senior officials interviewed explained that the inherent 
complexity of the prison population management was such that it had made 
computerization extremely difficult even in the late 2000s. Fatalism so deeply 
entrenched that it appears as a legitimate reason for non-change.  
 
Chronic capacity stress as a function of governance equilibrium 
 
An endless series of natural equilibria which are constantly changing as 
pressures change slightly. It’s like trying to design a bit of geology. The 
forces are greater than you can influence.  
Former senior Prison Service official in interview 
 
If there are blind spots in theoretical understanding of how policy systems sustain 
capacity stress, how can CCS help to shed light in this respect? What does it allow us 
to see that we would not otherwise? This assumes for a start that these blind spots 
contain dynamics that are worth seeing for researchers, for if they contain nothing 
much of interest, little is lost if we do not explore them. But the fact that many policy 
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systems appear to sustain symptoms of capacity stress over long periods of time 
should make the question interesting.  
In the four potential misalignments, I argue that we have the foundations of a 
heuristic that can bring these blinds spots usefully into more focus. They are the 
constituent parts of CCS, but it is in the dialectical dynamics between them, and their 
incorporated equilibriums, that CCS provides insights that more deterministic 
theoretical approaches cannot completely capture. In many policy systems, not least 
the few that I have mentioned here, we can fairly easily glimpse fleeting signs of 
capacity stress, and pulling on these threads can unravel these apparently dialectical 
dynamics that lie beneath. As the quote above suggests, there are ever-shifting 
equilibria in the governance of these systems, and understanding how to diagnose 
dysfunction, or to neutralise chronic characteristics, requires that we look at 
holistically at the aggravating and compensating dynamics within. In this last section, 
I discuss some implications of CCS for each of the blind spots.  
 First, the CCS schema shows how under-supply and over-supply dynamics 
can interact in important dialectical ways. In the prison system, for example, senior 
officials have successfully managed steadily to squeeze capacity in the estate in order 
accommodate population increase. Indeed, in interviews managers talk proudly about 
optimizing value for money by running the system continually at close to 100 per 
cent capacity (Bastow, 2013b). A direct consequence of this capacity tightening 
however is an ever-increasing reliance on administrative and logistical systems in 
place, and the associated difficulties of finding sufficient respite to modernize 
processes involved. If these processes are archaic or obsolete, when compared to 
wider practices in society, then further capacity tightening will likely lead to further 
reliance on these obsolete processes. We can use the analogy here of deploying 
workforce to dig ditches in a flooded field. We can increasingly squeeze the capacity 
of the workforce to dig faster in order to relieve the flooding, but continually doing 
so will only serve to increase reliance on essentially archaic processes if it continues 
to rain.  
 Similarly dialectical relationships between marginal under-supply and over-
supply can be found in other sectors. The problem of sustained obsolescence from 
the many disjoined ‘legacy’ database systems in the Department for Work and 
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Pensions has aggravated the need for administrative staff to cope by normalizing 
often eccentric and long-winded methods for processing applications and cases for 
different benefits. Indeed, contractors complain about the unforeseen costs of having 
to find ever more permanent ‘temporary’ fixes to keep legacy systems going while 
new digital systems are introduced. The outcome is that Department normalizes 
comparatively costly and labour intensive systems. Meanwhile, a sudden increase in 
the number of people seeking unemployment benefits requires the system is able to 
double its capacity in a short period of time. Because the system is labour intensive 
however, it is not easily able to absorb sudden demand increase, and the only 
response is to increase staff numbers to scale up the processing capacity. The 
implications of this are double-edged. On the one hand, the Department must adapt 
quickly to squeeze existing capacity to absorb this increase in demand. Indeed, very 
few organizations, even firms, find themselves in a situation of having to respond to 
a doubling of demand for their services in a short time. On the other hand, the system 
must inevitably double the existing eccentric and long-winded processes and the 
inherently human resources required to implement them. Of course, budget 
constraints mean that staff increases are marginally less than the actual increase in 
demand, and hence capacity stress is tightened.  Further pressure has been put on the 
system through the introduction of Universal Credit, thus accentuating coping, 
benign resistance, and obsolescence in the system (NAO, 2013a). 
  The second potential blind spot between strategic actor and cognitive-
cultural dynamics relates to an enduring axiom of social science, and obviously CCS 
cannot resolve this dichotomy. The schema merely shows how understanding chronic 
syndromes, in whatever configuration they take, does require a focus on how 
individual actors at all levels of the system (from high politics through to street-level 
officials) assess and adapt to the real-life predicaments they face. Key to this is the 
interaction between self-interest and dominant cognitive norms. For example, in 
coping cultures, norms of finding ways to ‘make the system work’ are strong enough 
that they can legitimate decisions that, by the admission of these actors themselves, 
are far from ideal and in many cases against their own preferences or self-interest. 
Duty managers responsible for regulating queues at Heathrow, for example, must 
find ways of making the system work in terms of scaling down security measures 
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against in order to get passengers through immigration as effectively as possible. 
This may not be ideal, but it may present an acceptable when evaluated against 
political risk of ‘queue crisis’ stories breaking in the tabloid press.  
 If however these discretionary ‘street-level’ measures for suspending certain 
types of security checks have become normalized over the years as part of coping 
cultures, these norms can be used quite strategically by politicians and managers to 
justify decisions taken. Arguments along the lines of ‘this is how we’ve always done 
things’ can be difficult for managers or politicians to challenge, particularly in 
potentially sensitive political or operational areas that can be easily destabilized (i.e. 
borders or prisons). In sectors such as borders and prisons, with strong entrenched 
street-level cultures and ‘dependent’ groups, it is understandable that managers and 
politicians may be cautious about introducing radical change into a system that it is 
in coping mode. Indeed, this links to the discussion above on how increasingly 
archaic processes can creep into systems over time. In borders, this discretionary 
flexibility to relax certain security checks has meant that politicians and senior 
officials have collectively deprioritized the development of more sophisticated 
planning and modelling tools that allow better matching of staff deployment and 
fluctuations in demand at the borders. Evidence suggests that border control is still 
set up in reactive mode to deal with these (predictable) fluctuations in demand (Vine, 
2013a, 2013b). 
 But as the CCS models depicts, systems rarely exist in pure coping mode, and 
actors within continually introduce or respond to bouts of reform and modernization. 
In the borders system, successive governments have invested considerable funds, 
particularly in the post-911 era, in modernizing the technology of the immigration 
and borders system (Dunleavy et al., 2006).  Managers and border staff have had to 
integrate new biometric and database technologies into what has traditionally been a 
fairly manual labour-intensive process. Yet contractual and implementation 
difficulties have meant that these modernization attempts have delivered only partial 
functionality (Vine, 2012). Indeed, the convergence of only partly functional 
biometric systems and surges in passenger numbers led to airport queue ‘crises’ 
during the summer of 2011 and spring 2012, and hence even heavier reliance on 
coping measures such as discretionary suspension. For staff and unions, stress is 
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further aggravated by radical reductions in resources and headcount on the frontline, 
again feeding into benign resistance to further modernisation (NAO, 2012). 
 Once we dig down to the individuals and actors facing these predicaments, 
we are reminded of the systemic limits to instrumental rationality. As Roberts and 
others have argued, achieving complete and sustained optimality in alignment of 
incentives is near-on impossible in ever-changing environments. For them, ‘strategic’ 
actors must recognize that optimality resides in sustaining ‘near-enough’ sub-
optimality over time. Yet even this tends to imbue strategic actors with sufficient 
perspective that allows them to see the system in this broader abstract context from 
above. The trouble is that actors working in real-life policy systems do not enjoy 
such vantage point, for they are too busy influencing, coping, and resisting in 
dynamic ways with real-life predicaments. Seen from a great height, the concept of 
optimal sub-optimality makes sense to the economist. Seen from the perspective of 
actors working in situations of constrained autonomy, it is much harder to imagine 
that they can coordinate the effects of their own decisions and behaviour sufficiently, 
even to this extent.  
 Finally, what are the implications for the dichotomy between deterministic 
and holistic explanations? As I have tried to illustrate, certain holistic dimensions 
need to be present in order for us to see capacity stress in its entirety. Conceptually, 
the schema takes into account dynamics of reform, coping and resistance in systems, 
and how these interact with their external environment. In this sense, CCS belongs in 
a rich and well-established tradition of social science holism. Theoretically too, the 
schema is holistic in that it incorporates some well-established theoretical axioms. 
And methodologically, it is inevitable that we must combine deductive and inductive 
research techniques in a holistic way in order to get to this point of development of 
the overall concept.  
 But the frustrating part is that we should aspire to identify specific causal 
relationships. If we were to ask ‘does this CCS schema constitute a theory or a 
theoretical model?’ the answer would have to be no. It cannot predict a certain set of 
outcomes given a specific set of inputs, and this for many political scientists will be a 
source of frustration. Some theories have undoubtedly been important starting points 
in development of the schema, but I have tried to show that none of these are alone 
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sufficient to capture capacity stress in its entirety. There is of course scope to explore 
specific aspects of the CCS model in more reductionist theoretical detail, perhaps test 
the limitations of specific theories, and develop indicators or metrics that are able to 
substantiate these individual elements. It would be possible to develop indexes of 
‘coping and crisis’ patterns, or reform and resistance, and begin to work these up in 
more sophisticated models of qualitative comparative analysis over longer periods of 
time. The fact also that CCS has developed out of one in-depth study of one system 
raises methodological questions about how to convert this form of deeper system 
analysis into a more systematic comparative analysis of different systems. Indeed, 
further questions remain about whether capacity stress is only identifiable in UK 
systems or whether we find similar signs of the dynamics discussed here in other 
countries and jurisdictions. I would estimate that we find similar examples of 
capacity stress outside of the UK, even though the underlying reasons and dynamics 
are likely to vary across different institutional, cultural, political or legal settings. 
CCS is a heuristic that is entirely transferable as a means to shedding light on these 
similarities and variations.  
 
Conclusions 
The analogy of pulling on a thread and watching a tapestry unravel seems apposite in 
describing the relationship between signs of capacity stress in policy systems, and the 
wider governance dynamics and operations of those systems. Signs of capacity stress 
come in many shapes and sizes, and as I have argued here, they are recognizable 
across different UK policy sectors. In diagnosing different signs of stress, it is likely 
that we will find a way into the CCS heuristic at a particular point, in other words, at 
any of its four main key misalignments:  
- Value-based goals out of kilter with environment change; 
- Cultures of coping and adaptation; 
- Benign or explicit resistance to reform; and 
- Technical obsolescence and inefficiencies in the system. 
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Once we enter this heuristic, it is often the case the these isolated signs of stress will 
interact in aggravating and compensating ways with other aspects, and these will be 
incorporated and incubated in the prevailing balance of the system over time. 
Of course, stress is often not isolated to one system, and can be contagious in 
a variety of ways. Pulling on one thread in one is likely to lead us to other systems as 
well. For example, we might focus on the lack of cell capacity in local UK police 
forces to deal with those taken into custody overnight. In recent years, police forces 
have had to accommodate many low-level offenders who suffer from mental health 
illness, simply because there has been insufficient capacity in NHS mental health 
establishments (BBC, 2013). For the actors involved, there are often similar 
countervailing dynamics involved. Having police forces provide a front-line for 
mental patient problems in society takes costs and pressures away from actors 
responsible for providing mental health services. Meanwhile, police chiefs see the 
benefits of sustaining the perception that this surplus demand is creating a dangerous 
burden on local police forces and one that is unsustainable in the long term. 
Equilibrium therefore is dynamic across systems as well as within.  
I have tried to show that setting up theoretical insights and axioms in 
competing ways can bring us only so far in helping to see CCS in its entirety. The 
CCS schema has been shaped deductively from holistic social theory, and the four 
misalignments have been developed more inductively through in-depth empirical 
analysis of the dynamics of policy systems under observable stress. Furthermore, I 
have set up the theoretical discussion in terms of potential ‘blind spots’ in order to 
show how complex systems can incorporate qualitatively distinct aspects of 
dichotomous pairs. It is hazardous to assume that these pairs will exist at either end 
of linear spectrums, as opposed to aggravating, compensating, or inherently 
dialectical relationships. Finally, it is in the relationships between the four aspects of 
the CCS schema that we find dynamic equilibriums over time, and it is the particular 
signs of capacity stress that must therefore be seen as characteristics sustained by 
these whole system equilibriums. Broadly speaking, stress can be seen as a function 
of these governance equilibriums over time.  
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i
 See Easton (1967) p24 
ii
 See Byers (2011) p15 
iii
 King et al. (1994) point out that ‘parsimony is a judgement, or even assumption, about the nature of 
the world: it is assumed to be simple. The principle of choosing theories that imply a simple world is a 
rule that clearly applies in situations where there is a high degree of certainty that the world is indeed 
simple. Scholars in physics seem to find parsimony appropriate, but those in biology often think of it 
as absurd. [...] (p20) 
iv
 Cairney (2013a) writes that evolutionary approaches ‘describe familiar processes of rule-influenced 
actions, actors adapting to their environments, and actors seeking to change the rules and their 
environments, and actors seeking to change the rules and their environments - in other words, the 
concept of 'dual causation' when 'agents interact and co-evolve with their environment’. (p290) 
v
 See also Cyert and March (2001) on this inherent sub-optimality. They write 'we have suggested that 
a business firm is constrained by the uncertainty of its environment, the problems of maintaining a 
viable coalition, and the limitations on its capacity as a system for assembling, storing and utilizing 
information. As a result the theory outlined in this volume characterizes the firm as an adaptively 
rational system rather than an omnisciently rational system’. p117 
vi
 Amann (2013) writes ‘what is now needed, in my opinion, is a national research programme which 
looks critically at how a broad sample of major public public service providers in Britain actually 
operate, and does so with the independence and intellectual depth demonstrated, for example, by 
Heclo and Wildavsky almost 40 years ago in their classic study of the UK Treasury (The Private 
Government of Public Money)’. 
vii
 The number of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) claimants increased from around 743,000 to 1,352,000 
between 2008 and 2009. Since 2001, the number of claimants had been stable at around 850,000. 
viii
 Vine found that checks against criminal warnings index had been suspended around 350 times 
across five French ports between July 2007 and October 2011 (2012, p23). Furthermore, biometric 
checks had been suspended at the ‘busiest times of day at the largest airport in the UK’ (Heathrow) 
(p12). 
ix
 ‘Disinvestment’ is the strongly euphemistic term to describe taking funding out of the system to 
establish lowest common denominator standards of service. The idea is to scale back performance that 
is considered to be above this standard.  
x
 In his 2012 evaluation of these relationships in the border control system, John Vine points out the 
need for the ‘Border Agency's operational autonomy from the Home Office needs to be explicit […] 
with a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities (2012, p9). This is something which has also been 
seen as a problem in the prison system in the nature of the relationship between the Home Secretary 
and the director general of the Prison Service over the years (Lewis, 1997). 
